Key Sections
Introduction
Continuation vehicles (“CVs”) have moved from the periphery of private equity to the center of today’s exit conversation. As traditional liquidity pathways navigate cyclical uncertainty and structural constraints, investors and sponsors are increasingly reexamining what “exit” really means.
Our view is clear: continuation vehicles are not a temporary substitute for muted exit markets — they represent a durable evolution in how private equity firms manage, monetize, and extend ownership of their highest-quality assets.
In this environment, the question is no longer whether continuation vehicles will play a role, but how they will reshape the broader exit landscape. Drawing on our experience as long-term capital partners, we see continuation vehicles less as an opportunistic solution and more as a strategic tool — one that aligns investor outcomes, can preserve value creation, and challenges the traditional notion of forced liquidity.
We sat down with Chris Crampton, Head of Blue Owl Strategic Equity, to share our perspective on this shift and to unpack how continuation vehicles are redefining exit dynamics across the private equity ecosystem.
Q&A
Q: How should investors understand continuation vehicles and their role in today’s private equity environment?
CVs are transactions that allow private equity sponsors to retain ownership of high-performing assets while offering liquidity options to existing investors. Historically, CVs were often associated with liquidity generation, and initially were executed with less than stellar performing assets. Today, however, they are more fundamentally a tool for extending ownership duration, allowing sponsors to avoid prematurely exiting assets where they believe additional upside can be realized with time and capital.
Sponsors pursue continuation vehicle transactions for a variety of reasons, with distribution to paid-in capital (“DPI”) generation, in our view, increasingly a byproduct rather than the primary motivation. At a fundamental level, GPs use CVs to retain ownership of their highest performing, highest conviction assets – businesses where operational value creation initiatives are underway and where they believe the majority of upside remains ahead. As sponsors have become more deeply engaged with operating partners and management teams on these initiatives (often requiring meaningful time, effort, and incremental capital) investment committees are increasingly questioning why that future upside should be transferred to the next private equity buyer, rather than retained by the existing sponsor through a continuation vehicle.
Nascent, fast growing, and gaining exit share with Sponsors:
of Sponsors plan to increase use of GP-Leds in next 2-3 years, with 35% expecting a significant increase1
of 2025 CV Sponsors were first time issuers2
of GPs that completed a CV desire to do so again3
of repeat CV GPs execute their next CV within 2 years4
estimated permanent dent in the sponsor-to-sponsor M&A market due to CVs5
PE-owned companies owned > 4 years that estimates suggest would take ~3 years of “healthy dealmaking” to unwind6
In our experience, many senior executives are drawn to private equity precisely because it allows them to avoid the operational complexity, distraction, and scrutiny associated with running a public company. Taken together, these factors suggest that the IPO market is, in our view, becoming a less efficient, less predictable, and structurally less attractive exit mechanism for private equity firms, reinforcing our perspective that its role in the buyout exit toolkit will continue to diminish over time, particularly as the growth in alternative exits like continuation funds accelerates. Indeed, more PE-backed buyout companies are staying private for longer, avoiding the volatility, cost, regulatory and public spotlight challenges associated with being public.
Q: If M&A market activity returns, are continuation vehicles still structurally relevant?
Our view is that a recovery in M&A activity would not diminish the relevance of continuation vehicles. In fact, history suggests the two are not mutually exclusive. 2021 marked an earlier peak for continuation fund volumes and, notably, coincided with the peak of sponsor-to-sponsor M&A activity, underscoring that CVs can function as a strategic portfolio management tool rather than a cyclical substitute for exits.7 Market observers have noted that, as the GP led market has matured, continuation vehicles have captured a meaningful share of traditional sponsor exits – with estimates suggesting that CVs have fundamentally captured ~10–15%+ of sponsor to sponsor M&A volume.8 Together, this evidence supports the view that continuation funds are likely to remain a durable and complementary exit pathway should M&A activity significantly accelerate.
Q: How does the IPO market compare as an exit pathway?
Our view is that the IPO market, independent of the rise of continuation funds, is in secular decline as a preferred exit route for traditional buyout investors due to several structural limitations and challenges:
First, preparing a company to go public requires significant time, attention, and upfront investment in systems, controls, and corporate G&A infrastructure.
Second, IPOs involve meaningful execution costs, including underwriting fees and significant public equity investor discounts that can approach 15-20% at IPO.9 In addition, the reduced leverage profile typically associated with being a public company can also lead to lower structural returns to buyout investors.
Third, sponsors must navigate extended lock up periods while being exposed to public market volatility and trading activity and volumes, frequently resulting in elongated and uncertain exit timelines as well as introducing the potential for material discounts on future secondaries.
Finally, the public company model places significant incremental demands on management teams, including time spent with public market constituents (analysts, investors, and conferences, etc.) alongside the heightened visibility and reputational risk associated with the public spotlight.
The number of publicly listed U.S. companies has declined by ~50% since the mid-1990's, falling from 8,000 to roughly 4,000.10
Q: When does it make sense for a sponsor to tap the IPO market as an exit mechanism?
We believe the IPO market tends to be best suited for larger, faster growing, venture backed companies, where scale, growth, and investor appetite more efficiently align. A key advantage of public markets is the ability to sell equity on a forward looking basis, rather than the traditional last-twelve-months (“LTM”) framework more typical in buyouts. For high growth businesses — often with smaller, minority venture investors with a more streamlined path to exit — this forward valuation can offset some of the structural challenges associated with IPOs. For more mature, less high growth, traditional buyout investments, however, the complexity, cost, and uncertainty of the public markets often outweigh the benefits, and we believe many sponsors — particularly those that initiated IPOs but struggled to fully exit positions during the 2019–2021 window — would agree with that assessment.
Q: To what extent would a reopening of the IPO market affect continuation vehicle activity?
Very little, in our view. In addition to our belief that IPOs are in secular decline as an exit path for traditional buyouts, the continuation vehicle market remains predominantly a middle market asset class. While CV transactions have grown in size and are increasingly viable for larger companies, we believe the vast majority of activity continues to involve middle to upper middle market businesses with enterprise values between approximately $500 million and $3 billion — companies that are generally not well suited to the public markets. As a result, we believe a reopening of the IPO market is unlikely to meaningfully displace continuation vehicles as an exit alternative.
Q: Against this backdrop, what structural factors are driving the continued growth of continuation vehicles?
In our view, the ability of a sponsor to retain ownership of their highest conviction, best performing assets while concurrently generating DPI optionality for LPs remains the chief reason for executing a CV transaction. However, there are several other critical factors – many of which are often less well understood or appreciated – that continue to support growth in continuation vehicles:
Access to incremental capital: CVs also enable sponsor’s portfolio companies to access primary capital, typically to fund future follow-on M&A or other growth initiatives without forcing a premature sale.
Alignment across stakeholders: They help better align exit timing among multiple sponsors or co investors involved in the same asset, reducing coordination risk and value leakage from misaligned horizons.
Strategic flexibility for sponsors: At the GP level, continuation funds can also grow AUM and reset economics while providing access to new investors and future potential LP relationships that may support subsequent flagship raises — making CVs not just a liquidity solution, but a strategic capital allocation and franchise building tool.
Q: What rationale for CVs do you believe are underappreciated in the market?
We believe the ability for lower to middle market sponsors to raise meaningful primary capital through a continuation vehicle is one of the most underreported and underappreciated benefits of CV transactions. In many cases, secondary investors can provide 20% or more of total commitments as primary capital11, typically earmarked for follow on M&A or other shareholder accretive initiatives. For smaller sponsors executing a CV around their highest conviction, best performing asset, this incremental capital can represent a material amount relative to the size of the original fund. Absent the continuation fund market, those sponsors would often have little choice but to exit the asset prematurely, simply because the legacy fund lacked sufficient capacity to support the company’s next phase of growth.
Q: What about management teams? How do they think about continuation funds?
We believe the benefits to management teams are another underappreciated benefit of a continuation fund transaction. From a management team perspective, continuation vehicles are often preferable due to:
Less disruptive execution:
Compared to a full sale, CVs are typically less time-intensive and significantly less disruptive to senior leadership, allowing executives to remain focused on running the business rather than managing a prolonged M&A or IPO process.
Reduced execution risk:
A CV can help avoid the stigma and uncertainty associated with a failed or delayed sale process, which can distract employees, unsettle customers, and weaken or impair growth in the underlying business.
Continuity in governance:
These transactions typically preserve existing governance structures and effective board dynamics, while limiting the “new partner risk” associated with introducing a new GP owner with a different culture or strategic priorities.
Liquidity with ongoing upside:
CVs often allow management teams to take some liquidity off the table — typically a minority portion of their ownership and less than would be sold in a full M&A transaction — while maintaining potential upside participation, a dynamic sponsors sometimes describe as “halftime” to their management teams: a moment to reset, crystallize some value, and recommit to the next phase of growth with continuity and alignment intact.
Q: How do you view the long-term outlook for continuation vehicles?
We believe the secular tailwinds underpinning the continuation vehicle market will not only endure but accelerate over the long term. As dedicated buyside capital for CVs continues to grow, we expect continuation funds to become more frequent, larger in scale, and increasingly oriented toward larger, high quality buyout assets, particularly for sponsors that historically relied on the more expensive, time consuming, and uncertain IPO exit path discussed earlier. What began as a niche liquidity solution has evolved into a mainstream portfolio management tool, representing an estimated ~14% of sponsor exits in 202512, roughly tripling its share in just five years. At the same time, many scaled, high-quality assets are increasingly remaining private, effectively achieving “private IPO” status via sponsor-led liquidity events and further reinforcing the demand for continuation vehicles as an alternative liquidity solutions.
While we believe continuation vehicles offer compelling structural advantages, they are not without risk. CV transactions involve single-asset or concentrated portfolio exposure, valuation complexity, potential GP-LP misalignment, and extended illiquidity. As with any private markets strategy, past performance and structural tailwinds do not guarantee future outcomes.
What began as a niche liquidity solution has evolved into a mainstream portfolio management tool, representing an estimated ~14% of sponsor exits in 2025 , roughly tripling its share in just five years.12
Looking ahead, we expect this share to continue to expand as the asset class grows, matures, and becomes more institutionalized and widely embraced by both GPs and LPs. Indeed, we believe the long-term outlook for continuation vehicles remains exceptionally strong, and we are excited to be active participants in this important evolution in the private equity landscape.
Sources
- Source: DC Advisory Secondary Report 2025
- Source: Morgan Stanley Private Capital Advisory – Continuation Fund Market Review Full Year 2025. (February 2026)
- Source: Upwelling Capital Group Research – Are LPs Missing the Boat?
- Navigating the Nuances of Continuation Vehicles (Baird, July 2024)
- Source: Campbell Lutyens
- Source: Bain & Co
- Source: Morgan Stanley Private Capital Advisory – Continuation Fund Performance (2025); Morgan Stanley Private Capital Advisory – Continuation Fund Market Update (2025)
- Source: Schroders Capital. Redefining private equity. How continuation investments are disrupting the buyout market. Schroders Capital (August 2025)
- Source: Evercore Private Capital Advisory – FY 2024 Secondary Market Review (January 2025)
- Source: Columbia Business School; World Bank (WFE database)
- Source: PJT Partners Secondary Market Insights (2025)
- Source: Jefferies Private Capital Advisory – Global Secondary Market Review (January 2026)
Important disclaimers
Unless otherwise indicated, the Report Date referenced is March 31, 2026.
The information contained herein (“White Paper”) is provided for educational purposes only and is not investment advice or an offer or sale of any security or investment product or investment advice. Offerings are made only pursuant to a private offering memorandum containing important information, which describes risks related to an investment therein and various other important matters. Information contained herein is not intended to be complete or final and should not form the primary basis for an investment decision.
This White Paper is solely intended to summarize Blue Owl Capital Inc. (together, with its affiliates, “Blue Owl”) current observations and views surrounding the asset class. This White Paper should not be relied upon for any other purpose. Any views and opinions expressed above are those of Blue Owl and are based on available information and there is no implication that the information contained herein is correct as of any time subsequent to such date.
Certain information contained in this White Paper may constitute “forward-looking statements” which can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “target,” “project,” “estimate,” “intend,” “continue” or “believe” or the negatives thereof or other variations thereon or comparable terminology. Forward-looking statements, projections, or opinions contained in the White Paper are provided for information purposes only and general commentary. There can be no assurance that the results set forth in the forward-looking statements, projections, opinions or the events predicted will be attained, and actual results may be significantly different. Also, general economic factors, which are not predictable, can have a material impact on the reliability of forward-looking statements, projections, or opinions. Neither Blue Owl nor any of its subsidiaries, affiliates, agents or representatives makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein.
This White Paper includes historical data, projected figures, calculations, and other data that is sourced either by a third party or by Blue Owl. Reasonable efforts were made to attribute third party sourced data to its source. Data sourced or calculated by Blue Owl was done so in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Blue Owl shall not be responsible for data presentation or calculation errors that were made in good faith, including errors in transmission from other sources where such data may be in original or more complete form. Data produced by Blue Owl, including any underwritten and projected performance metrics, should not be relied upon for any purpose whatsoever, other than that they are believed to be reasonable as of the date presented. References herein to specific sectors are not to be considered a recommendation or solicitation for any such sector. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results and there can be no guarantee against a loss, including a complete loss, of capital.
Copyright© Blue Owl Capital Inc. 2026. All rights reserved.